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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

Notes — 2

Historical Revisions —
Archibald S. Foord and *T. C. Mendenhall* 4

Social Studies Revisited —
Joseph S. Grover 15

Maps and Their Use — *A. O. Vietor* 20

Singapore — A Problem in Empire Defense —
Lewis M. Wiggin 26

Yale's Master of Arts in Teaching Program —
Theodore Andersson 38

EDITORIAL NOTE

With this issue the present Editor resigns. He has no regret for the difficulties which face his successor, and, in fact, he passes them on with relief. He has, on the other hand, great regret at parting with the many pleasures he has enjoyed while in office.

To the new Editor he wishes success. Not the sole improvement in the *Bulletin* in its first nine years has been the change from a red to a blue cover. The magazine now appears regularly four times a year, its number are of approximately equal length, its articles are less disjointed. In short, the *Bulletin*, is becoming stable. Quotations and reprints from its pages are beginning to appear in other journals with some frequency, and even the circulation is increasing, a pleasing wonder to a board whose chief concern remains not what to print but how to pay for what is printed.

There is more to a magazine than a desire to publish it. To succeed the new Editor needs the active support of those for whom the *Bulletin* is designed. He needs readers who tell him both when they like and dislike what he is doing. And he needs readers who are willing to share his work by submitting their ideas and beliefs for publication. They need not worry—the Editor will reject all unprintable offerings.

At its recent business meeting, the N.E.A.S.S.T. elected Mr. Richard T. Flood, of the Noble and Greenough School, Vice-President for 1952-3.

A resolution was passed in memory of the brilliant and generous work of Dr. Waldo Emerson Palmer.

The Membership Committee of the New England Association of Social Studies Teachers has requested that all present members submit the names of those who might be interested in joining the Association and furthering its work.

MARCH MEETING OF THE N.E.A.S.S.T.

The N.E.A.S.S.T. held its March Conference on Saturday the 29th, at Radcliffe, under the joint auspices of the Association and the Harvard Teachers' Association.

The subject of the meeting was "The Middle East—Problems and Potentials." Dr. Erwin Raisz, Lecturer in Cartography at

Harvard, described the cultural influence of ancient Rome, as well as that of modern Europe, on the lands of the East. His talk was fully illustrated with impressive slides of people and places, which aided immeasurably in understanding his own remarks and the following speeches and discussion.

In the second address, Mr. Charles R. Harding, Director in Charge of Middle East Interests of the Socony-Vacuum Oil Company, presented the industrialist's practical view of the Middle East. Oil is to machines what oxygen is to men, and mechanical superiority is the basis of this nation's present international position. Furthermore, Europe obtains three-fourths of its oil from the Middle East. The Arabs continue to be friendly in business dealings with Americans, and the economic and social improvements being made by private American capital in the area suggest that these friendly relations will not cease.

The second half of the meeting was devoted to panel discussion, in which the two principal speakers were joined by several others from Boston and New York, all of whom had had experience in the Middle East. The relation of the Soviet to the Middle East, and the problems facing the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, were the two topics of widest general interest.

Historical Revisions

The Peace of Augsburg—The Edict of Nantes

A little more than fifty years ago Professor Henry Vedder published an English translation of the Religious Peace of Augsburg (1555), to which he appended the following comment:

> It is strange that a historic document of so capital interest should have been so little studied. The summaries contained in the various histories of the period are at best so unsatisfactory, and at worst so wholly misleading, as to compel the conclusion that the authors have never seen the document at all. . . . Let any student compare for himself the above document with the accounts of it that he will find in the best historical works accessible to him, and he will be once for all convinced of the profit, not to say necessity, of going to the original sources for his facts.[1]

In the process of exposing our students to original sources as the central part of our course in European history, we have been struck again and again by the fundamental soundness of Professor Vedder's observations, not only with reference to the Peace of Augsburg, but also to many other documents of equal significance. The textbook summaries, often technically accurate, are at the same time actually misleading, for the bald phraseology in which they necessarily are couched creates a false impression of the forces at work in the making of history. Of the numerous examples that have come to our attention, we offer herewith for the consideration of our fellow gildsmen two which seem worthy of note.

I. The Peace of Augsburg

The summaries in the best college texts have given us the uniform impressions that: (1) the Peace contains the famous Latin phrase *cuius regio eius religio* ("whose territory, his religion") as the explicit principle upon which the settlement in Germany was based; and (2) this principle was a compromise worked out at Augsburg in 1555 for the first time as a despairing concession to reality. Neither of these impressions is correct.

[1] *Crozier Theological Seminary Historical Leaflets*, No. 5 (Chester, Pa., 1901), p. 11.

The original text of the Peace is in German. The definitive redaction edited by Karl Brandi[2] contains not a single Latin phrase of any kind. It is true that a Latin translation of the Peace was made later,[3] and all English translations are taken from the Latin version, but even there *cuius regio eius religio* does not appear. Moreover, neither the original text nor the various translations include any phrase or clause which could conceivably be rendered by this apothegm.

The principle of "whose territory, his religion" is nevertheless unmistakeably inherent in several clauses of the Peace. By clauses 3 and 4 the Emperor and princes bound themselves to allow each other peacefully to abide each in his own "religion, faith, church usages, ordinances, and ceremonies," whether those of the Augsburg Confession or of the "Old Religion," as then established or as they might hereafter be established by the individual rulers. Clause 15 sought to rivet the faith of the prince upon his subjects by a mutual guarantee: the first article of this clause, never fully translated in the English versions of the Peace, may be rendered from the intricate German original as follows:

> Further, no Estate shall compel the spiritual or secular subjects of another to [adopt] its religion, or lure away the subjects of another, or take the subjects of another under its protection and care against their true overlord (with the exception of those who from time immemorial have had to accept and still do accept such protection and care from another lord); and particularly, if the subjects of one or more Estates should determine to rebel against their true overlords upon pretext of religion, or should determine to burst forth and undertake any innovation in their religion, without the knowledge and approval of their true overlords, then upon the strength of this Peace the other Estates should give their true overlords earnest and true support, aid, and assistance until those disobedient subjects shall again be persuaded and reduced to obedience.

The second article of the fifteenth clause, as is usually recited, permitted subjects to move from one territory to another "for the sake of religion." Thus it would appear that *cuius regio eius religio*, though never in any form expressed as a principle, was nevertheless the basic assumption underlying the religious peace of 1555.

[2] *Der Augsburger Religionsfriede vom 25 Sept.* 1555 (Munich, 1896).

[3] See Christoph Lehmann, *De Pace Religionis Acta Publica et Originalia* (Frankfurt, 1707-10 I, 62-5.

That the principle was assumed rather than stated appears to have been the result of three factors, all of which indicate that practical recognition of princely control over the church was a great deal older than the Peace of Augsburg. In the first place, as is generally realized, the German princes had in fact determined whether their subjects should become Lutheran or remain Catholic ever since 1521. In the second place, and this is seldom observed, the practice had possessed specific legal sanction since 1526. In that year, by the "recess" of the Diet of Speier, the Estates of the Empire had "unanimously agreed and resolved" in matters of religion "each one so to live, govern, and carry himself as he hopes and trusts to answer for it to God and His Imperial Majesty."[4] It was hoped at Speier, as indeed it was also later at Augsburg, that a religious doctrine to which all could subscribe would eventually be worked out: in each case the 'agreement to disagree' was regarded as a temporary solution. But the right to disagree—the general juridical power of the individual Estate in affairs spiritual—was not considered a transient matter.

For, in the third place, it seems that even before the Reformation the principle of *cuius regio* had had a long history in the Holy Roman Empire. A prodigious amount of admirable German scholarship has been lavished upon this subject over the last sixty years, and it would be presumptuous to attempt a summary of it in brief compass. But one may fairly point out two important findings which throw considerable light upon the origins of the "territorial principle" in religious questions.

When Catholic Christianity was established among the Germanic tribes, Teutonic law did not regard the Church as a juristic personality possessed of particular legal rights. Rather, every church building with the income and property attached to the foundation was considered the rightful possession of the lord upon whose land it was built. It was known as a "proprietary church" or *Eigenkirche*. The lord controlled clerical appointments and collected a share of the revenues of the foundation. In Carolingian and Saxon times the institution of the "proprietary church" spread from the parochial to the episcopal and abbatial level, as the emperors came to regard bishoprics and monasteries as their possessions. Indeed, by the early eleventh century the Franconian emperors had apparently come to look upon the Papacy itself as one of their *Eigenkirchen*. The Gregorian reform movement successfully destroyed the enlarged

[4] Leopold von Ranke, *History of the Reformation in Germany* (tr. Sarah Austin; London, 1905), p. 429, n. 1.

imperial claims, but in the lands of the territorial princes the institution of the "proprietary church" lived on, to be merged into the system of feudal tenure with its elaborate series of dues and services.[5] Before the Reformation, therefore, the German princes had exercised what they considered to be an immemorial right, rooted in ancient law, to control the churches located on their lands.

As long as no serious schism developed within the Church, the question never seems to have arisen as to whether the princes' powers extended to doctrinal matters. The territorial lords probably had as genuine a horror of heresy as did other medieval rulers. But in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the Conciliar Movement, Hussite heresy, and the Great Schism presented the Estates of the Empire with real alternatives, which actually forced a choice in matters of greater import than local personnel and revenues. Moreover, these alternatives appeared at a time when the German princes had achieved a very large measure of independence. Imperial power had decayed rapidly in the second half of the thirteenth century, and as its disintegration proceeded, the territorial lords seized upon every means to increase their control of their own lands. The concept of sovereignty did not yet exist, but the princes clearly strove to establish territorial supremacy in matters spiritual and temporal. Duke Albert IV of Austria, who died in 1365, once asserted, "I myself intend to be Pope, Archbishop, Bishop, Archdeacon, and Dean in my lands."[6] In 1367 the Dukes of Bavaria declared, "Our lands are free; Pope, Emperor, and King have no powers of command within them.[7] In the same era appeared the saying, "The Duke of Cleves is Pope in his own lands,"[8] so great was his control in matters ecclesiastical. In fifteenth-century Saxony the Dukes carried out visitations of the monasteries by secular officials, and upon one occasion the Duke declared that "he would himself be Pope, Emperor, and German Master in his own lands."[9]

[5] On this subject, see Ulrich Stutz, "The Proprietary Church as an Element of Medieval Germanic Ecclesiastical Law," tr. in G. Barraclough, *Studies in Medieval History, Medieval Germany* 911-1250 (Oxford, 1938), II, 35-70; and Justus Hashagen, *Staat und Kirche vor der Reformation* (Essen, 1931), pp. 558-60.

[6] Albert Werminghoff, "Neuere Arbeiten ueber das Verhaeltnis von Staat und Kirche in Deutschland waehrend des spaeteren Mittelalters," *Historische Vierteljahrschrift*, XI (1908), 167.

[7] *Idem.*

[8] Karl Rieker, *Die rechtliche Stellung der evangelischen Kirche Deutschlands* (Leipzig, 1893), p. 40.

[9] Emil Friedberg, *Die Graenzen zwischen Staat und Kirche* (Tuebingen, 1872), p. 101.

The evidence suggests, therefore, that in the fifteenth century the German princes held firmly to the principle of secular control of the Church. Before the Reformation, matters of dogma were not involved, but the Utraquist Compromise of 1436, by which the Papacy reluctantly recognized the Hussite heresy as the creed of the established church in Bohemia, was an indication of what might occur.[10] "We all have the faith that our princes have," wrote Aeneas Sylvius, later Pope Pius II, to the Imperial chancellor in 1443: "if they worship idols, we also would worship them, and we would renounce not only the Pope but Christ himself if urged to do so by the secular power."[11] From princely domination of the Church's mundane concerns to state interference in doctrinal issues was but a short step, and when Lutheranism made its appearance, the Estates of the Empire took the step with apparent assurance of legal rectitude.

The question still remains, whence originated the phrase *cuius regio eius religio?* None of the authoritative works on the German Reformation provides an answer, and as far as I can determine, its exact provenance is lost in obscurity. The legalist Bluntschli, writing in 1860, considered "that foolish sentence *cuius est regio, eius est religio*" to be "the jlristic consequence" of the Peace of Westphalia (1648), but he offered no documentary evidence.[12] Nevertheless it would appear that the Latin aphorism, although probably used earlier, was not recorded until after the Thirty Years' War. Burkhard von Bonin, in a work on the Reformation published in 1902, stated that he could not discover any "certain information about its first emergence." The earliest form in which he could find the phrase was in a sort of quodlibetical question, published in a book of 1695, which ran "*An cuius regio eius sit religio?*"[13] This may have been the origin of the phrase, but that its earlier use by German lawyers gave rise to the question seems a greater likelihood. A noted contemporary scholar, Gerhard Ritter, also inclines to this opinion. In a recent work he states that the principle of *cuius*

[10] See Ernest Denis, *Huss et la Guerre des Hussites* (Paris, 1930), pp. 448-51, 465-79.

[11] Rudolf Wolkan, ed., *Der Briefwechsel des Eneas Silvius Piccolomini* (3 vols., Vienna, 1909), I, 255. The occasion of Aeneas Sylvius' remark was a proposal by Charles VII of France to end the schism between Eugenius IV and Felix V by a council of secular princes, rather than prelates. Aeneas Sylvius thought the proposal a practical means of settling the issue.

[12] J. C. Bluntschli and K. Brater, *Deutsches Staats-Woerterbuch* (Stuttgart and Leipzig, 1860), V, 567. The phrase does not appear in either of the treaties that made up the Peace of Westphalia.

[13] Burkhard von Bonin, *Die praktische Bedeutung des ius reformandi* (Stutgart, 1902), p. 29.

regio prevailed at Augsburg, but that it was "first formulated thus by later jurists."[14] Toward the end of the eighteenth century the legal historian Puetter referred to "the adage *cuius est regio, eius et religio*" as if he expected his readers to be familiar with it,[15] and thereafter in one form or another it appears frequently in legal studies labelled as an adage, maxim, axiom, or principle.

Not, however, until the latter part of the nineteenth century did the historians come to attach the phrase to the Peace of Augsburg. Leopold von Ranke, whose monumental work on Germany in the age of the Reformation was completed in 1847, did not mention it in his chapter on the religious peace of 1555, nor, as far as I can discover, did any historian of Europe, the Christian Church, or the German Reformation use the phrase in that context until 1882.[16] In this year a German scholar, J. J. Herzog, write that by the Peace of Augsburg "was established the territorial system with the motto *cuius regio eius religio*."[17] Also in 1882 T. M. Lindsay, a Scottish historian, described "the principle which underlay the settlement, *cuius regio eius religio*, as it was called."[18] Whether or not these two historians can be held responsible for creating the initial false impression, since their time historians generally, though not universally, have connected the aphorism with the religious peace of 1555, usually in such a manner as to induce the reader to believe that the text incorporated the Latin words. For example, the professor of ecclesiastical history at Yale, G. P. Fisher, whose *History of the Christian Church* was first published in 1888, wrote that the Peace of Augsburg "embodied the celebrated maxim *cuius regio eius religio*."[19] In E. F. Henderson's *Short History of Germany* (1902) one finds, "The great achievement of the treaty was the establishment of the principle *cuius regio eius religio*."[20] And A. F. Pollard in the *Cambridge Modern History* authorized the

[14] Gerhard Ritter, *Die Neugestaltung Europas im 16. Jahrhundert* (Berlin, 1950), p. 184.

[15] J. S. Puetter, *Anleitung zum Teutschen Staatsrechte* (Bayreuth, 1793), III, 414.

[16] This generalisation is liable to error, since the Yale library, though amazingly complete in the field, does not possess every one of such historical works written before 1882, and the resources of the admirable inter-library loan system could not fill all the gaps. It may be observed, however, that *cuius regio eius religio* does not appear in connection with the Peace of Augsburg in the great surveys of Michelet, Duruy, Dyer, Stubbs, Baur, Schmid, and Hagenbach, all written before that date.

[17] *Abriss der Gesammten Kirchengeschichte* (3 vols., Erlangen, 1882), III, 160.

[18] *The Reformation* (Edinburgh, 1882), p. 40.

[19] *History of the Christian Church* (N. Y., 1888), p. 317.

[20] *A Short History of Germany* (2 vols., N. Y., 1902), I, 393.

perpetuation of the false impression by stating that at Augsburg the Latin aphorism was "the formula in which the German territorial princes expressed the fact that they had mastered the Church as well as the state."[21]

The first American textbook to teach the school or college student that *cuius regio* belonged in the Peace of Augsburg seems to have been Ferdinand Schevill's *History of Modern Europe*, originally published in 1898. Neither James Harvey Robinson nor George Burton Adams, both of whom had read the text of the Peace, made the mistake in their general histories. But despite the increasing tendency to spare the modern student all Latin tags, he still encounters the famous adage, uniformly identified with the German settlement of 1555, in such excellent and widely used textbooks as those of Hayes, Abbott, Barnes, Hyma, Gillespie, Ergang, Palmer, and Ferguson and Bruun.

As to how and why this error crept in to general historical writing in the 1880's, one can only speculate. The authors never explain by documentary reference where they acquired their information. It seems plausible to assume that the historians picked up the Latin phrase from the German legal studies of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and since it expressed in epigrammatic form the principle underlying the Peace of Augsburg, they gradually persuaded themselves that the German princes had invented both the phrase and the principle in 1555. Perhaps Bismarck's *Kulturkampf* and the widespread anticlericalism of the late nineteenth century provided an atmosphere favorable to the popularization of a quasi-classic epigram which may have seemed to give historical precedent and sanction for the policies of secularization then being pursued in Western Europe. However that may be, the evidence clearly suggests it was the failure of the historians to read the original sources which led them into the mistake of identifying with the Peace of Augsburg a principle, whose origins were much older, expressed in a phrase probably not invented until much later.

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II. The Edict of Nantes and the Huguenot Towns

In the words of *1066 and All That* the Edict of Nantes (1598) has long occupied a "memorable" position in the textbooks. This is particularly true of the section which is usually

[21] *Cambridge Modern History*, II (1903), 278.

paraphrased somewhat as follows: as protection against another Massacre of St. Bartholomew, the crown allowed the Huguenots to garrison more than a hundred (some textbooks magnify this figure to two hundred!) walled towns at the King's expense. On investigation the confusion here proves to be primarily one of over simplification. Often, the textbook intimates that this grant of *villes de sûreté*, with all its implications for the sovereignty of the crown within France, was a relatively new device, wrung at the last moment from a ruler whose overpowering purpose was peace. Secondly, the number and types of towns involved varies enormously from textbook to textbook. And finally, the upkeep of the towns and the dltimate fate of the device are frequently obscured or ignored in the average text book.

An effort at clarification must begin with a better understanding of the origins and nature of the Edict of Nantes. Since his succession in 1589 Henry IV had been in almost continuous negotiation with the Reform party concerning a general religious peace throughout the kingdom. Their demands, representing an accretion of privileges and assurances which had grown up over the last quarter century of civil violence and clearly outlining the final settlement in 1598, included complete liberty of conscience and secret worship, local rights of public worship in all Protestant chateaux and towns and in one city in each *bailliage* and *sénéchaussée*, eligibility for all public offices, and control over the towns which were then in their possession. The Huguenot position had hardened with Henry's conversion in 1593, and the next year saw their meeting at St. Foy which in a mood of despair for the future revived the project of twenty years before, a federal republic of protestant congregations covering all of France. If such a state within the state may be more properly considered the extreme Huguenot position, the Reform party came to view general liberty of conscience, specific liberty of worship in certain places, and political control of certain towns as an irreducible minimum. During the two years 1595-97, the Huguenot assemblies remained in almost continuous session, attempting to secure from the distracted king and the reluctant parlements official, definitive confirmation of their demands.

Meanwhile Henry was slowly clearing the way for such a settlement. The strongholds of the Catholic League were quietly falling into royal hands, while the energetic prosecution of the war against Spain rallied all conciliatory or Politique sentiment behind the national monarchy. In January, 1598, began the negotiations with the Spanish envoy which were to end five months

later in the Treaty of Vervins. A tour of the west that spring revealed the wide-spread interest in bringing faction and religious strife to an end. At Nantes in April the king signed the famous Edict, settling and consolidating the status of the Protestants in France for the immediate future.

Actually there are four documents which are often individually or collectively referred to as the Edict of Nantes. The first, the actual Edict, was signed by the King on 13 April, 1598 and grudgingly registered by the Paris parlement the next February. The 92 general or public clauses of this "charter of the rights and privileges of French Protestants" (Lavisse) set out the broad outlines of the settlement, excluding the question of the *villes de sûreté*. The next document, containing 56 secret or particular clauses, was signed by the King on 2 May and also registered by parlement the February following. It is concerned with the minutiae of personal and territorial adjustments required by the general statements of the first document. Apparently the King desired them kept secret, although he wanted the document to have the weight of a registered edict. The third document is a writ of grant from the King, dated 13 April, which assigns 45,000 crowns a year to the Huguenots "to meet various expenses which they have occurred," in fact a royal grant for the support of ministers, students, and the protestant poor. The fourth document is also a writ of grant (i.e., it had the force of a royal decree but not an enregistered act). Signed on 30 April, it contains 23 articles, of which the first 13 concern the *villes de sûreté*.

In the first and second articles the king granted to the Huguenots complete control "under the authority of his Majesty" of all places, cities, and castles, with or without garrisons, which they held as of August 1597. The grant was to run for eight years after the day of publication of the Edict. For the support of the garrisons to be maintained in these places the king set aside 180,000 crowns each year (articles 4 and 5). Except for the specific mention of a few places in the remaining articles of this decree, the Edict of Nantes says no more about the *villes de sûreté*. The reason is quite obvious; in this particular, as in so many others, the Edict merely recapitulated or reaffirmed conditions which had existed and had even been the subject of negotiation for many years. Thus, in order to find the number and kind of places granted the Huguenots, in 1598, we must review briefly the history of the *villes de sûreté* during the wars of religion.

Towns, and especially walled towns, quickly became pawns, either for military, religious, or bargaining purposes, during these struggles. The third war (1568-70) saw the Huguenots lose most of the strongholds they had originally held. Yet the treaty of St. Germain specifically restored to them four towns, La Rochelle, Montauban, Cognac, and La Charité, for a term of two years. By 1577 they had secured eight towns by treaty, and the term had been raised to six years. The crown usually agreed to contribute towards the cost of the garrisons, but the money was rarely forthcoming. During the next twenty years most of the temporary halts in the wars included the specific assignment of a handful of towns to the Huguenots, although in the course of the fighting they must have controlled many more. Thus, in 1597 they were occupying over 140 places, of which about 100 were capable of resisting a sizeable military force. In May 1598 after the writ of grant was signed, the King drew up the lists of places. Of these the most complete modern list identifies 143 names which can be conveniently divided into four types: proper *villes de sûrete* or fortified towns of some size in Huguenot hands, 48 in number; *places de mariage* small towns which lacked their own garrisons but were under the wing of their stronger neighbors, 16 in number; royal free towns, governed by their own officials and also lacking a garrison, five in number; and finally, 74 private, individual properties or *chateaux*. If the five free towns, ancient centers of Huguenot power (La Rochelle, St. Foy, Montauban, Nîmes and Uzes) are connected on a map, the resulting crescent gives an excellent idea of the geographical distribution of these 143 strong points throughout western and southern France.

The size of this list, in the light of the handful of towns singled out in the earlier truces, deserves special mention. The Huguenots insisted on the specific inclusion of so many names for a variety of reasons: they were determined to secure the good execution of the Edict; they claimed (probably wrongly) that the Catholics still held many; the task of sorting out the ones to give back after a quarter of a century of fighting was hopeless—better to keep them all; and finally, the canny Huguenots hoped to convert some Catholic governors in some of the towns, to whom ther jobs might well be worth more than a mass. Henry temporarily acceded to this swollen demand largely to obtain the pacification he so ardently desired.

That he was mindful of the dangers of such apparent alienation of royal authority is shown by the original term of eight

years included in the Edict and by his subsequent actions. He soon stopped paying the sum promised for the garrisons; by 1601 his annual contributions were less than a third of the original promise. Before his death Henry had already recovered the *villes de sûreté* belonging to the Maréchal de Bouillon. Although he and his successors grudgingly renewed the grants for brief terms of years, they were snapping up the *places de mariage* and the private chateaux whenever opportunity offered. In 1621, during the civil war, the crown recovered more than 80 places, and article 7 of the Edict of 1629, which ordered the demolition of all town fortification within three months, spelled the end of the *villes de sûreté.*

How should the textbook read? Surely, the number of actual towns should be put under a hundred; it should be clearly indicated that this was a practice born of the experience of the religious wars; and Henry IV, although he may have granted an exceptional number of *villes de sûreté* in the interests of concluding a peace, was well aware of the dangers implicit in his policy.

Note: The French texts of the various documents comprising the Edict of Nantes are to be found in many places; possibly the most convenient is L. Anquez, *Histoire des Assemblees Politiques Des Reformes De France* (1573-1622), (Paris, 1859), pp. 456-502. An English translation is in J. Fontaine, *Memoirs of a Huguenot Family* (N. Y., 1853), pp. 453-499. The list of *villes de sûreté* is found in Anquez, *op.cit*, pp. 161-6, who also includes a very useful map at the end of the book complete with all the towns. In all probability the common error of "over two hundred towns" has been taken from the great Huguenot historian of the Edict, Elie Benoist, *Histoire de L'Edit de Nantes* (Delft, 1693), 5 vols. who mentions in a most general way that the Huguenots had over two hundred places in 1599 (I, 222, 240) without citing any list.

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Social Studies Revisited

Several years ago the Wooster School underwent a change of life. Prodded by reports from colleges bemoaning the lack found among their freshmen of preparation in basic skills, the faculty sought a new approach to their fundamental task—instruction in techniques which would enable graduates to undertake successfully studies at the college level. Accordingly a committee was appointed to evaluate the curriculum and to recommend whatever changes seemed necessary to accomplish the deceptively simple aim of teaching adolescent boys how to read, write, and think. The new curriculum, radically different from its conventional predecessor, was instituted in the fall of 1947.

Central to the thinking of those responsible for its development was the belief that compartmentalization of studies at the secondary-school level was a positive hindrance to the student's attempt to master these skills. Perhaps in the fields of history and English the problem was most clearly apparent and the solution most readily available.

The ability to read with understanding is certainly no less necessary in the study of a history text than in the appreciation of a novel; a student's essay on the French Revolution should be evaluated not only in regard to its awareness of historical fact but also in regard to its accuracy and effectiveness as judged by literary standards. In writing an analysis of *Othello*, the student can no more ignore the facts of plot, character, setting, and figures of speech than he can overlook the Congress of Vienna, the weariness of France, and the aspirations of Prussia in discussing post-Napoleonic Europe. In both subjects the student must deal with facts, draw logical conclusions, and present them clearly and effectively. Yet in the past the discipline of history—its insistence upon fact—was almost exclusively the province of the teacher of social studies; and the discipline of language—its grammar and rhetoric—remained almost exclusively the concern of the teacher of English and foreign languages.

Since the committee was firmly convinced of both the truth and undesirability of the situation outlined above, the solution appeared inevitable: combined courses in English and the social studies at appropriate levels, with each of the new courses taught

by one instructor who would award one grade in what was actually a two-credit course. Only gradually did the full implications of this step become apparent even to those who originally proposed it.

First was the obvious achievement of doubled stress on instruction in the basic techniques; once these had been mastered the student would be equipped to engage in any future activity dependent upon understanding, systematic thinking, and communication. Second was the possibility of rewards to be gained from the concurrent study of a given historical era and the literature arising from it. And third was the hope that the student following this program over the four-year period would arrive at a better understanding of Western Man as revealed from the earliest of recorded history to the present. The idealists who were the first to envision the possibility of achieving the last of these objectives had some grounds for optimism in the final recommendations of the committee. At the ninth-grade level, along with the usual drill in grammar and composition (on both literary and historical subjects), boys were to undertake the study of the Bible, Bulfinch's *Mythology*, the *Odyssey*, and the *Aeneid*, while following man's progress through the period generally covered in ancient history courses. In the tenth grade, boys would focus their attention on Medieval and Renaissance history while analyzing Shaw's *Saint Joan*, Hugo's *Hunchback of Notre Dame*, and Rostand's *Cyrano de Bergerac*. In similar fashion juniors and seniors would learn modern European and American history as revealed not only in conventional texts but also in selected fiction, drama, and poetry.

At this moment it is impossible to judge to what extent the new curriculum has succeeded. Yet to the writer, who is currently engaged for the second year in teaching one of these four courses, the answer is clear. To the boy of above-average ability, for whom it was originally designed, the integrated program has real meaning; those less able will certainly not lose anything and may well gain from certain aspects of it. Perhaps a more detailed description of the eleventh-grade course in modern European history and English, known as History III, will indicate the basis for this confidence that methods and ideas formerly taught in separate courses can profitably be combined into one.

The search for appropriate texts was undertaken with some care; the results are not wholly satisfactory, and thus the following titles do not necessarily occupy a permanent place in the syllabus:

Medieval and Modern Times—Robinson, from James I to the present; *Readings in European History*—Robinson; *Othello; Tom Jones; Vanity Fair; Mayor of Casterbridge; Of Human Bondage; Christ Stopped at Eboli; Cry, the Beloved Country; Adventures in English Literature*—Inglis, Cooper, *et al.*; *Modern Short Stories.*

Before a single text is opened, the instructor must face and resolve certain problems. The first is his natural tendency to stress one phase of the course at the expense of the other. In order to realize the aims of the course the instructor must attempt to create in the student's mind the concept that in its widest meaning history is the chronological record of *all* man's significant activities, that consequently *Vanity Fair* is as valid a fact of history as the Stuart Restoration. On the other hand, the instructor must take care not to interpret literature as simply the response of a sensitive mind to pressures of an economic, political, or other deterministic nature. Primary emphasis in criticism should be placed on judging literature according to its own standards, taking internal evidence into consideration; only in this manner can the student gain any knowledge of aesthetics. Then there is need to remember the original purpose behind the new curriculum; the student must constantly be drilled in the techniques of reading with understanding, thinking with clarity, and writing with effectiveness, both on literary and historical subjects. Once these problems have been decided—and the foregoing rather dogmatic statements represent only one approach—the instructor can start out with both goals and methods fairly well fixed.

The first term of History III opens with an intensive study of *Othello* primarily from a literary point of view, with a secondary purpose of reviewing briefly the Renaissance, discussed at length in History II. As the history texts trace the pattern of events across the map of Europe, the student spends considerable time getting to know the cultural aspects of the seventeenth century through a study of the essays of Bacon and the poetry of Milton. Once the content of the essays has been thoroughly assimilated and the nature of the essay as a literary genre clearly defined, class discussion follows in which explanation of the inductive method is given and the origin of modern science in Baconian thought becomes apparent. When the class has arrived at an estimate of Milton the poet, his predominantly religious point of view is seen as both shaping and shaped by the ideas of his time.

In studying the early decades of the eighteenth century, students, come to recognize that satire is a literary device valuable both for itself and for its more revealing picture of what the history text calls "General Conditions in the Eighteenth Century." Belinda and Sir Dapperwit, Sir Roger and Captain Sentry, Tom Jones and Partridge bring the past back to life in far more compelling terms than any conventional social studies text can approximate. In addition the instructor can direct further study of literary types; and, if he is sufficiently alert to avoid genial generalities, he may attempt to formulate a statement of the Neo-Classical doctrine of art, which is seen to derive so naturally from an authoritarian, aristocratic environment.

As the attention of the class is directed to the revolutionary movement in France, the instructor can point to a parallel trend towards humanitarianism and freedom from artistic conventions in English poetry, climaxed by the flamboyant individualism of certain Romantic poets.

Such nineteenth and twentieth century phenomena as imperialism, the industrial revolution, materialism, socialism, evolution, and the new religion of science all appear far more meaningful when their basic ideas are re-expressed, and in some magic fashion humanized, in literature. Conversely, the literary trends of these two centuries gain immeasurably in significance when placed in the broad context of contemporary political, economic, social, and religious attitudes.

These approaches are obviously only a suggestion of what can be accomplished in such a combined course. In the process of analyzing the texts, the instructor will find other opportunities for vitalizing the study of history and reinforcing the impact of literature. He is restricted only by the ability of the particular class he is dealing with and by his own realization that after all he is teaching students at the secondary-school level.

Perhaps the basic educational philosophy of the Wooster School has at this point emerged in outline. It is realistic in an insistence upon the student's mastery of those basic skills of reading, writing, and thinking which are indispensable to his understanding of man and his full participation in society. It is idealistic in that, while teaching these fundamentals, it seeks to extend the adolescent mind and communicate concepts of lasting validity. Though it may well be subject to justified criticism in certain respects, the new curriculum in social studies

based upon this humanistic philosophy represents the School's best answer to the need for sound pre-college education.

JOSEPH S. GROVER
Assistant Headmaster
The Wooster School

/ for social studies

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THE STORY OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
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Maps and Their Use

We are all ignorant. It is only a matter of degree and subject —the statement applies to the scholar as well as to the ditch digger. Ignorance about the other fellow's activity is universal in this day of specialization. At one time a man might attempt to be versed in all knowledge, but today such a well-rounded individual is almost as extinct as the heath hen.

The gulf between individuals in different fields has necessarily widened with the passing of time. Complexity piles upon complexity with frightening effect and learned men become more and more insulated and isolated from one another. The teacher is removed from his colleagues in other disciplines, the business man is on a totally different plane from the teacher, the laborer dwells apart from the scholar. This observation is not new of course, and attempts are always being made to break down the separating walls. The hunt for a common meeting place goes on and this search is especially apparent in the environment of a university where scholars are occupied in so many diverse fields. Social units are devised to bring cross sections of learning together under one roof for mutual discussion and understanding. Yet success in this is doubtful and many still pursue their own narrow ways with questionable regard for the enterprises of their associates.

There is, however, one common meeting place, at least physically speaking, for all these assorted individuals, and one spot to which all of them must perforce come if they wish to exert their influence to the limits of their ability or to undertake productive research. This common ground is the university or college library. Here, ranged row upon row in eloquent silence, rests a vast portion of man's recorded knowledge. While the library may be described as a common meeting place for those scholarly souls whose quest is never ending, it does not serve in the least as a forum for the exchange of their ideas. They come to nourish themselves at the fountain and they then retire to their own spheres to continue their individual activities. Although attempts are being made in many institutions to try to bring the specialists together, there remains little liasion, and it is this lack which affects so much the comments which follow.

A library is much like a gigantic tool box for the use of a divergent faculty and from which each extracts and selects

implements for shaping his own and his students' minds. In the tool box are stored, figuratively speaking, saws, planes, hammers, screwdrivers, each instrument suited for its own particular task and its own particular craftsman. Among these tools is one which is, in many instances, ignored by the workmen. It is a clumsy tool, an odd-shaped one, difficult to fit into the tool chest and equally difficult to keep in condition for those who wish to use it. This strange instrument is the map. Needless to say, everyone accepts maps as useful tools of the scholar's trade, but few go beyond this acceptance. How many take the trouble to dig into the box, to fish out this clumsy tool, and then, having taken it in hand, actually make use of it?

It has been the writer's good fortune to have presided over a considerable collection of these map tools for the past ten years. He has been privileged in adding to the collection and having been able to exert a guiding hand in the direction and growth of a specialized group of research materials. He has seen what use scholars have made of them, and he has seen their reactions to the materials.

Since the early days of the last war maps have begun—and 'begun' is written advisedly—to be actively used by individuals outside the armed forces as tools for their research. The beginning is at best small, but it represents a start at overcoming what is, by and large, the result of faulty education among the teachers and scholars of the nation. Geography has labored for many years under the ridiculous handicap of being considered an elementary subject, one which belongs in grammar school, or at the very latest in high or preparatory school. What obvious nonsense this is can be readily perceived by the survey printed last year in the New York *Times*, which so clearly demonstrated the abysmal ignorance of college youths concerning the most simple facts of life, geographically speaking. It is fatuous to suppose that students at these upper levels will absorb the complex of geography during their years of study of other disciplines by osmosis or by any other such automatic process. When one reads the remarks of some of those queried in this test about their knowledge of the world in which they live, one more readily understands why it is so difficult to achieve an international point of view in America. The time for geography is at all educational levels, with varying degrees of intensity at each. At a minimum geography should be a required course for college freshmen.

This amazing lack of sophistication towards the geography

of the world is clearly reflected in the prevalent attitude of neglect towards the maps in a university collection, unless that university happens to place great emphasis on cartography.

At best maps are used as a background for commentary on the physical-political aspects of a country or countries. They are back drops in a theatrical sense, against which the instructor acts his part.

Maps, however, should be more than a drop curtain for professorial gymnastics. They are tools on a par with the written word and they can tell an involved and complete story. They are a language. They are pictorial as well, and they appeal to that side of man which enjoys a fine painting or a lovely landscape. Here is the art of the map, an art which weaves its thread throughout map history from the earliest days to the present. It is a characteristic often overlooked in this machine age, for it is intimately associated with an individual map maker. And it is the art phase which renders intelligent map making a difficult science. Apart from the graphic impression appealing to the emotions, there is the hard core of knowledge, so definite and so concrete, which is the chief reason for a map's production. This core must hold the key to the understanding of the final product and a certain training and familiarity with the medium is required before it is possible to extract the information easily. Familiarity in this sense does not breed contempt, but rather continuing and ever deepening admiration for the finished object we know as a map.

A study of the early days of map making and an attempt to interpret man's first desire to construct a map soon shows that to fashion something of this sort is an almost automatic response for man. This response may be seen in action among the peoples of the world at their first contact with western civilization. When James Cook arrived in the Society Islands he found the natives well versed in the understanding of map making and a number of them were able to present to him a graphic depiction of the other islands in neighboring waters. Arctic explorers have continually commented on the ease and ability with which Eskimos are able to produce relief maps carved in wood or constructed from snow and ice. Even the Australian aborigines, among the most backward of all peoples, have techniques for making rough but comprehensible maps. All over the world one can find map making preceeding writing: the desire for man to portray himself in relation to his environment is universal.

With this in mind, it is easy to see how the art of map making

progressed to the relatively high degree of competence known today. Techniques and processes have been developed by the score for mapping of every variety. It is necessary to consider these wonderful and marvelous products as vital and available adjuncts to our mythical tool kit for educators and scholars. Cities are erected and businesses are often located on the basis of map information. Traffic flow patterns and other maps contribute to the construction of better and safer highways. Mining, power, agriculture and flood control, are only a few of man's activities which owe their progress in one way or another to the use of a map. Unfortunately maps are not limited in their use to such peaceful fields. The black scourge of war is dependent on maps to a staggering degree. Millions of sheets flowed forth from the printing presses in preparation for the invasion of France. The allied navies used hundreds of thousands of charts for the conquest of the seas and the airmen an appalling number for their purposes.

A map collection is nothing but another source of human information, put down in a unique but essential form, a form which can receive international understanding. Anybody can read a map to some degree no matter his tongue. Only the text proves a major barrier to the complete picture. Maps are universal in character and interpretation.

What should a university map collection consist of? How should it be housed and in particular how should it be integrated into the library unit as a whole? Certainly every institution of higher learning cannot have a priceless accumulation of rare and early maps as well as those run of the mine things which always have to be on hand. If, however, a reasonable number of maps exist at all they should be given the care they deserve. Unfortunately the awkward shape and size of most maps makes them very unwelcome in a book librarian's eyes. The equipment to house a map collection is expensive. Flat horizontal cases which, by and large, are the best type, are extremely costly and require considerable floor space. A substitute arrangement can be made by having open wooden shelves constructed for map folders but this is inflexible and prone to collecting dust. In addition to the large amount of space required it is essential to have sufficient room for readers to spread out. When one 'spreads out' with maps one consumes a great deal of space and plenty of tables are thus necessary. Maps can not be carried to and fro as books are and require tender and careful handling. If readers and maps are not close together such a high hurdle is erected between them

that full and easy use of the materials will not be possible. Nothing is more hampering to research than the carrying of large folders of maps from room to room, not to mention the hazards to the maps themselves. Good lighting is also a necessity and atlases and map reference books should be shelved nearby, for this contiguity is also an important factor to intelligent work.

As with all such things, funds especially earmarked for map purchase are an essential prerequisite. A map collection should not be dependent on crumbs from library book funds, but it should be supported as an independent entity. Happily the liberal use of the photostat is one method of offsetting the cost of rare and expensive historical maps. Maps are a category of reference and research materials which can be copied by photostat in their original size at a very low cost and which then can be used in the reproduced form without the need of clumsy reading machines or enlargers. By the judicious selection of photostats a satisfactory historical collection can be compiled rather simply.

Any college or university map library should have affiliated with it or as part of its operating function a laboratory for the construction and creation of new maps. Maps required by individual research for a book often demand a different and specialized technique if one is to produce a worthy product. Authors may have innumerable ideas for intelligently depicting their research on a map base but they are often frightened off by a realization of their own limitations in an alien field. In view of these ever present difficulties, it is desirable to have a laboratory in the charge of a cartographer who can translate individual ideas into map form. The venture must be cooperative for both the cartographer and his customer, with much of the technical work resting on the cartographer's experience and knowledge. This rather difficult blending of two professionals frequently deters the average faculty member from creating and making use of maps with benefit to his project.

To get around these bunkers is not easy. For students, map instruction and geographical training will overcome many of the obstacles. For the average faculty member, one must overcome any natural inertia present when a new tool is offered for use. To defeat indifference to new ideas requires the education of the educators, and competition is often engendered by knowing that one's colleague is using map tools as visual and mental aids. The last war has proved the long recognized fact that visual aids can be more than elementary or high school ways of spoon feeding. One prominent eastern university has recently established

an audio-visual center on an experimental basis which is proving itself of considerable value. Again, even for this innovation, considerable difficulties must be overcome. Classrooms need modernization, electrical facilities must be provided for projection machines and light control. After the facilities are provided someone must use them. In a properly equipped classroom maps can be reproduced in slide form rather than in the customary manner. Still, someone must take the initiative and select the maps and see that slides are made.

To break into this vicious circle will take time. Intelligent training in the use of maps must occur in the graduate schools where our future instructors are learning their trade. Extra credit might well be given those graduate students who are willing to do just that bit more which map use requires. Encouragement in the visual approach to problems should be part and parcel of their training, although well above the purely illustrative level. If nothing else, the physical-political globe of the world must be branded into every mind graduating from an educational institution, as much a part of an educated man's background as the ability to read and write. Responsibility for this lies squarely in the lap of the present graduate school administrations. If they do their job the use of maps in teaching will reach the degree of importance which ought to be accorded the materials themselves.

A. O. Vietor

Sterling Memorial Library

Singapore

A PROBLEM IN EMPIRE DEFENSE *

(7)

These arguments form a background to the construction and completion of the Singapore naval base, especially up to 1932, when work had progressed so far that it would have been almost impossible to discontinue further development. In February of 1923, when England was in a state of active depression and postwar economic readjustment, the Cabinet took action on the Admiralty plans and placed the measure for Singapore before Parliament in March. The conservative majority survived the debates on the naval estimates, and official announcements stated that work had actually begun in January, 1924.

Japan's attitude, while never favorable, was at first understanding: although there was no need for the base, since Japanese intentions were entirely peaceful, England only exercised her sovereign rights in internal affairs.[1] In time, however, Japanese opinion became increasingly hostile. At the start the Japanese Navy Minister had said that his country must now look to her own defenses.[2] While the official Japanese approach soon became "it cannot be helped," underneath developed a strong current of fear and distrust, an attitude more and more apparent as time passed.[3]

With the exception of Canada, the Dominions at the Imperial Conference of 1923 supported the plan enthusiastically. Australia and New Zealand, who had opposed construction at the 1921 Conference because they still relied on the Anglo-Japanese

* Part I of this article appeared in March, 1952.

[1] Statement of Count Uchida, Japanese Foreign Minister, London *Times*, 1 July 1923.

[2] *Ibid*, 23 July.

[3] cf. Commons Debates, 23 March 1925, pp. 117-8, 127. Many Japanese thought construction at Singapore was the direct result of the end of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and that it illustrated how closely England and the United States were being brought together. Suggestions that the United States use Singapore as a base horrified Japan. (cf. London *Times*, 19 March 1925.) Japan attributed much to the end of the Alliance: "As might be foreseen the Manchurian question proved a turning point and the friend of yesterday has become the foe of today. Speaking broadly, it is the natural result of the denunciation of the Alliance." (Lt. Cmdr. T. Ishimaru, *Japan Must Fight Britain*, Harrisburg, 1936, p. 60.)

Alliance, had been strongly in favor of the project ever since the Alliance had been dropped.

The Straits Settlement bought land and presented it to the British Government at about the time the pacificist MacDonald became Prime Minister in January, 1924. Singapore had not been an election issue, but preliminary work on the base was stopped in February. MacDonald notified the Dominions that work was being discontinued and requested their opinions. In reply, only South Africa supported his action. The other Dominions heartily disapproved: MacDonald had exhibited a misunderstanding of the nature of Empire interdependence and had used an entirely high-handed method of 'consultation.' Conservative opinion at home naturally supported this attitude.[4]

In support of his move the Prime Minister maintained that Singapore conflicted with the fundamental British policy which advocated the League of Nations and favored the end of armaments' races. To discontinue construction was a sign of England's good faith in this policy.[5]

Yet, if this were policy in fact, it was difficult to explain the very recent arrangement made for construction of five new cruisers, as well as a strengthened air-force. Was dropping the base but a gesture to Labor politics, and not to international good will? If it were the latter, then the stoppage should have been made in connection with some international conference. None was forthcoming. Viscount Curzon said he wished others would make a gesture once in a while.[6]

Again and again the arguments for and against the base were renewed. Australia pointed out that the strength of the League in large part depended upon the British Navy. New Zealand considered that a weak British Empire might lead to the "deterioration of humanity as a whole." Lord Jellicoe, speaking for that country, said "it may turn out to have been a pity that the League was ever brought into being if the defense of the Empire is to depend on the League of Nations only."[7] At home, Mr. Amery spoke for the Conservatives: "the present government have decided to leave three fourths of the Empire and one half of

[4] Bruce of Australia said: "clearly if we cannot look to Great Britain we must look to ourselves." London *Times*, 28 March 1924; cf. *ibid*, 2 and 7 Feb., 26 March; Cmd 2083, *Singapore Naval Base*.

[5] *Ibid;* London *Times*, 18, 19, 26 and 27 March. MacDonald's support in Commons was 287-211.

[6] Parliament Journals, 9 Dec. 1925, p. 18; Commons Debates, London *Times*, various.

[7] Cmd 2083, *Singapore Naval Base*, pp. 9-10.

our trade defenseless in order to make a gesture to the world at large, and, I presume, to Japan in particular.'"[8]

The Japanese, needless to say, were elated by the turn of events.[9] Canadian opinion continued to be non-commital.[10] But Australia and New Zealand grew loud in their condemnations: this was lack of "Empire vision." The Government then pointed out that if they liked the base so much it was surprising they had not offered from the first to assist in paying for it. Prime Minister Massey hastened to point out that the last New Zealand Parliament had voted £100,000 towards Singapore, although this was in fact too late.[11] Bruce of Australia now suggested that his country might offer money; but when the project seemed definitely to have been dropped, Australia, in June, 1924, approved a five year naval program to build four cruisers costing £7,500,000.

Conservative British opinion, and all sides in Australia and New Zealand, considered MacDonald's act to have been a reversal of cooperation within the Empire, and an act of bad faith towards the Empire as a whole. At the least, it had the effect of bringing the two southern Dominions face to face with their own defense problems.[12]

No work was done at Singapore from January to November of 1924. The materials already gathered were offered for public sale in June. In November, however, the Labor Government lost office—again Singapore was not an election issue—and at the end of the year the Conservatives determined to resume construction.

Again much discussion ensued. Opposition regretted that the Rule of War was replacing its own Rule of Reason.[13] A new issue arose because the Government abandoned the Geneva Protocol which MacDonald had strongly urged the previous September. Government, said Labor, thereby abandoned collec-

[8] London *Times*, 12 April 1924. Mr. Amery had said previously: "After all . . . you cannot rely upon an indefinite future of peace . . ." Parliament Journals, 1 May 1923, p. 472.

[9] Statement of Baron Matsui, Japanese Foreign Minister, London *Times*, 7 April 1924; *ibid*, 12 March.

[10] *Ibid*, 25 March. In reply to MacDonald's telegram Prime Minister King had not seen how "this on our part calls for any comment"! (Cmd 2083, *Singapore Naval Base*, p. 8)

[11] *Ibid*, pp. 9-10. London *Times*, 18 December 1923; 22 March 1924.

[12] *Ibid*, 29 April, 1 June 1924. The Imperial Conference of 1923 had laid down the "guiding principle" that Dominions look after their own local defense. (Cmd 1987, 1923 Imperial Conference, p. 16).

[13] Commons Debates, 9 December 1924, p. 121.

tive security as a solution to the world's ills. But Conservatives could not see the compatibility of policing the world, which the Protocol would have demanded, with cutting down naval forces and bases, which Labor was demanding.

Work on the base resumed by June, after a delay of about a year and one half. Japanese opinion was definitely hostile. Viscount Kato, Japan's Prime Minister, found he did not like it; but after all it was an internal concern, not intended to influence international affairs. He had known for twenty years that sooner or later the base would be built.[14]

(8)

The Imperial Conference of 1926 formally endorsed the Singapore project and requested Dominion aid. Australia declared that she would be unable to assist because of the large naval program on which she had embarked. Hongkong had given £250,000 in March, 1925, and in November, 1926, the Federated Malay States made a voluntary gift of $2,000,000. The following September New Zealand voted to contribute £1,000,000 over a period of eight years.[15]

The Geneva Naval Conference of 1927 broke up without having accomplished anything except possibly worsened Anglo-American relations. England and the United States could not agree on cruiser specifications, and now there was even some talk in the newspapers of a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. In any event, the three leading naval powers continued the naval programs which they had begun in 1924-6. Within Japan hostility towards Great Britain increased, and became more and more apparent with the development of Japan's "positive policy" in China. Labor now found that policy the direct result of Conservative building at Singapore.

By March, 1929, all preliminary work on the base at Singapore had been completed. It was expected that the whole would be finished by 1936. The cost to date had been £1,443,355, of which only £269,344 had come from the Navy budget, the rest being Dominion contributions. A Dutch firm, for £200,000, had recently towed the new floating dock to Singapore, and the contract for the yard at £7,500,000 had been let in September, 1928. But while the Navy League complained this progress was much too slow, in the House of Commons Sir Austen Chamberlain was urging,

[14] London *Times*, 20 December 1924; see also 23 December, 5 March 1925.

[15] See Cmd 2769, Appendices to Proceedings of the Imperial Conference, London, 1926.

with questionable realism, that his country and Japan should formally ally.

Ramsay MacDonald again became Prime Minister in June of 1929. The new Government announced that naval expenditures must be reduced. In July MacDonald allowed that there might well be a change of policy at Singapore. After consultation with President Hoover a decision was taken to hold a world naval conference. In November the House of Commons heard that work at Singapore would be "slowed down," pending the results of this conference.[16]

Reaction was immediate. Again the Dominions believed they had not been properly consulted. In the previous July Australia had urged MacDonald to complete the base.[17] New Zealand quite logically considered that since she had contributed money toward construction she had a right in determining policy at Singapore.

Conservatives saw no reason to link the base with the proposed conference and felt that even more than in 1924 a domestic issue was being clothed in international dress. They agreed with the Australian newspaper *Argus*: "The disturbing conclusion is that the Labor Cabinet in Great Britain is making the base a pawn in the political game." This seemed especially true, since Government announced it would not go into the conference with Singapore as a "bargaining counter."

The Japanese announced that they had no intention of raising the issue of Singapore at the coming Conference: the base was already too nearly completed and the strategic situation would be much the same even if no more work were done. At the same time, realizing that she could not afford to ignore Singapore,[18] Japan happy at the turn of events, thought it would be "splendid" if the base were not completed as originally planned.[19] Japan quite naturally seems to have been somewhat confused about what to expect from England's changing fronts in policy.

The London Naval Conference of 1930 did not touch the question of Singapore. An attempt was made to carry out the principles of the Washington Conference but the whole met with only a limited success. In Japan the results were denounced and in fact led to the political defeat and assassination of Premier Ezio Hamaguchi, the person who most defended them.

[16] Parliament Journals, v. 11, p. 31.

[17] London *Times*, 27 July 1929.

[18] cf. *ibid*, 24 June 1927.

[19] For the preceeding paragraphs, see *ibid* 14 November 1929-24 January 1930; Commons Debates, 21 November 1929.

The British Government in March of 1930 decided to proceed slowly with construction at Singapore: so much had been done already it was only economical to finish what had been started.[20] But nothing new would be begun.

In October of the same year an Imperial Conference agreed to no new policy, but resolved that upon completion of the present work on the graving dock there would be a moratorium for fiive years on new construction. At that time the matter would be "reviewed in the light of conditions then prevailing."[21] This decision apparently satisfied all concerned. As world economic conditions demanded more and more attention interest in the base became dormant. Australia possessed a new Labor Government. New Zealand determined for the moment to rely on the League of Nations; she too had a Labor Government and found herself diverging more and more from vacillating British foreign policy. Defense expenditures of the two Dominions rose in the 1930's and New Zealand took pride, with some justification, in the fact that she paid her contributions towards the Singapore base, despite these expenses and her extremely serious economic position.[22]

On 18 September 1931 occurred the Mukden incident. Japan had invaded Manchuria. She did so partly to offset the London Naval Treaty, partly to relieve internal conditions. Her act brought to an end the Nine Power Treaty signed at the Washington Conference which had guaranteed the integrity of China. It also once and for all settled Ramsay MacDonald's mind quite conclusively. The British Government announced that work would proceed at Singapore at full speed, regardless of economic conditions.[23] And as the Japanese became more untrustworthy, work went on more rapidly. In March, 1932, MacDonald, now at the head of the National Coalition Government, requested more money for the naval establishment. Parliament acquiesced immediately and the policy determined at the recent Imperial Conference was put aside without regret on anyone's part. This constituted the final major change in British policy regarding naval construction at Singapore. The first base ship took up station in July, 1933.

[20] London *Times*, 18 March-1 May 1930. The cost to July amounted to £2,577,000, £1,672,000 of it Dominion money.

[21] *Summary of Proceedings*, Conference of 1930, Ottawa, 1931, p. 38. Trade decisions taken at Ottawa added to economic unrest in the East.)

[22] London *Times*, 19 May 1932.

[23] *Ibid*, 1 October 1930.

Much in the world led to an acceleration of the work. Europe showed some concern over Hitler; the Italians were in Ethiopia; civil war flourished in Spain; in the Far East Japan had invaded Manchuria. The world over it was becoming clear that the League of Nations was not working as it had been designed to work. The Manchurian incident did not contribute to the League's prestige, and in March, 1933, Japan announced her withdrawal. The Japanese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs thought "a collective system as advocated in Britain" might be "an important instrument . . . but Japan is in need of a more acute and necessary doctrine for herself."[24]

Japan's growing textile trade was a point of aggravation to Great Britain and her Dominions, especially Australia. Trade negotiations in 1934 failed. More important were the Anti-Comintern Pact of November, 1936—to which Japan adhered—Japan's rapidly expanding navy, the "China Incident" of 1937.[25] The rumor that Japan would build a canal through the Isthmus of Kra, where Malaya was but fourteen miles wide, only added fuel to the fire. As distrust grew on both sides, Anglo-American friendship in turn increased.

Fear and a sense of insecurity on the parts of New Zealand and Australia was always present in this period. By the time of the Imperial Conference in 1937 their apprehension was clear. At last New Zealand understood that the League did not function properly, that her defense was her own, not a world, concern.[26] Australian opinions were similar and they became increasingly hostile to Japan in view of that country's high-handed actions, and particularly in view of the reactions to the Australian trade diversion policy. In both Dominions the belief grew that England would be unable to come to their aid in time of need.[27]

[24] *Far East Review*, v. 30, p. 292. (Statement in 1934.)

[25] It was at this point that Australian proposals for a conference on regional security in the Pacific were finally dropped. Meanwhile, Japan was being advised to prepare a "wiser policy"; to concentrate her "diplomatic energies" on those European powers who sought any "opportunity" to restrain Great Britain,. (Ishimaru, p. 176.) *Japan Must Fight Britain.*

[26] I. F. G. Milner, *New Zealand's Interests and Policies in the Far East*, N. Y., 1939, p. 86.

[27] J. Shepherd, *Australia's Interests and Policies in the Far East*, N .Y., 1939, pp. 73-4, 101. It was thought in 1938 that any force "reasonably expected" to be at Singapore "would be of little assistance" against a raid on New Zealand. (*Contemporary New Zealand*, New Zealand Institute, Wellington, 1938, p. 259.)

On 29 December 1934 Japan served notice at London that she did not intend to renew the limitations contained in the Washington Conference, which were to lapse in 1937. In January, 1936, failing to receive her "common upper limit of tonnage," she withdrew from the London Naval Conference. These acts came as no surprise to realistic thinkers. Manchuria had pointed to them. Japan's public declaration that the Washington Conference and similar meetings were incompatible with her search for "equality" was but a blind for the growing demands and responsibilities imposed by nationalism in the search for prestige, as well as by the necessities, particularly economic, entailed by the 'forward policy' in China. Together with these considerations was dissatisfaction with the London Conference's decision regarding her navy, and a new realization of the capabilities of modern naval design. In Japanese demands for equality were seen a false understanding of her needs to possess security, excused as naval growth for adequate defense, and the demand for the prestige of parity.

By 1938 there was no question that Japan was a world power and, moreover, meant to be treated as such. But these intentions were not new. "What Japan has insisted upon, what she still insists upon, is that she shall not be made the object of discrimination and derogatory treatment by any of the nations with whom she has relations,"[28] was one comment in 1933. As early as April, 1934, from the Foreign Office came the clear announcement: "We regard Japan as principally responsible for the maintenance of peace in Eastern Asia and we are determined to fulfill this mission."[29] Here in effect was a Japanese Monroe Doctrine. English and American objections to it were not answered.

What this official statement means in its appeal to Asiatic populations, in creating ill-will towards Europeans, especially the English, cannot be determined. In any event, Japan's activity in the East meant that Great Britain could make no move, even in Europe, without an eye on Tokyo, and on what she conceived was her defense against Tokyo, Singapore. That base now perhaps would justify its creation. There would be only a short time

[28] Ishii, Viscount K., *The Permanent Bases of Japanese Foreign Policy*, (N. Y., 1933) p. 8.

In 1936 both Japan and the United States began large naval programs, and Japanese Army growth roughly paralleled that of Russia. Army expenses increased 47% from 1931-2 to 1935-6.

[29] Quoted, Blakeslee, G. H., *Conflicts of Policy in the Far East* (N. Y., 1934) p. 22.

before Japanese aims would become so apparent to the world that a clash with the Western powers could no longer be avoided.

At the same time, as the European scene darkened, British Far Eastern policy became less sure. "The degree of British participation in Far Eastern events must necessarily be determined primarily by the state of things prevailing in Western Europe at any given time."[30] British preoccupation with European affairs Far Eastern policy during this period presents a tragic spectacle of knowing what was the right thing, almost the decent thing, to do, while being entirely too weak to do anything at all. Possibly the Japanese statement that "the British idea of trying to preserve its interests in the Far East, especially in China, is a fundamental mistake,"[32] was not far wrong. Great Britain was unwilling to make the final break with Japan because she was unable to go to war. She lacked the necessary support from the United States,[33] as well as the Empire, to stop Japan. In fulfilling her policies Japan had everything to gain and nothing to lose. Tokyo gauged United States policy and found that it would not act; she gauged British policy and found that it could not act. Japan did just what she thought she could get away with.

The Imperial Conference in the Spring of 1937 spent much time considering problems of defense. In subdued tones it noticed "the great importance from the Australian point of view of the Singapore base" and "accordingly was glad to be informed . . . that substantial progress" had been made toward the completion of the naval base and its defenses.[34]

Late in 1936 the British suggested to the United States that the terms in the Washington Treaty regarding bases be retained, although permitting new fortifications, while the naval ratio be dropped. Great Britain had little to gain and a great deal showed, perhaps, some of the disadvantages of Empire.[31] Her

[30] *Political and Strategic Interests of the United Kingdom* (Royal Institute, London, 1939) p. 18.

[31] On the opening of Singapore the editorial of 15 February 1938 in the London *Times* read: ". . . if the cost of creating the base has been heavy that is part of the inevitable penalty of having much to defend in a troubled world."

[32] Quoted in a Japanese magazine in "Japan's Challenge to the West," (*Round Table*, v. 28, 1938, p. 231) Chinese policy which played England and Japan off against each other contributed to Far Eastern confusion.

[33] cf. *ibid*, v. 25, pp. 11-12. Sir John Simon and Mr. Stimson did not agree over Manchuria, and England lost her chance of securing active support from the United States.

34. Cmd 5482, Imperial Conference of 1937, Proceedings, London, 1937, pp. 17, 19.

to lose by new construction in the Pacific. The Far East was the one "depressed" area in the field of British strategy. Here her weakness was as "palpable" as was "the impossibility of remedying it an early date."[35] England believed that Japan with an old fleet and new bases was more dangerous than Japan with a new fleet and old bases. Particularly did the thought of a new base at Formosa[36], only 1,625 miles from Singapore, and 200 odd miles from the outpost station at Hongkong, seem unattractive. Japan would be that much nearer to attack on British trade and Dominions, as well as to complete domination in China. The British hoped that to allow the Japanese to construct a new fleet would make them willing to agree to the base limitations. A new fleet, without a Formosan base, could not constitute much more of a threat to Singapore and Empire defense than already existed.

The United States, however, did not subscribe to this proposal and it was dropped immediately. The Philippine problem was growing increasingly complex. Less and less was heard of American plans to withdraw. The Tydings-McDuffie Act of March, 1934, which greatly impaired the Open Door policy, had left the United States with the question of Philippine defense unresolved. The Washington Conference had left Philippine security to Japanese good-will, not to American naval strength. The Japanese alliance with the Axis brought this fact into sharp relief. Japan's need for raw materials, especially lumber and minerals, could be satisfied with ease in the Philippines. The small percentage of arable land in the Philippines already under cultivation, and the population density of about 120 persons to the square mile compared to Japan's intensity of 455, were inviting. The United States found statements like those of Hirota, the Japanese Foreign Minister, disturbing: "If the United States desires an amicable solution of the pending problems . . . the United States should keep its hands off Far Eastern affairs and place implicit confidence in Japan's efforts to maintain peace and order in Asia. The world should be divided in three parts, under the influence of the American, European, and Asiatic Monroe Doctrines."[37]

The 'New Order in Eastern Asia' might easily clash with

[35] Bywater, H. C. "Britain on the Seas" (*Foreign Affairs*, v. 16, p. 216).

[36] In 1935 Japan announced a ten year plan for the naval development of Formosa and the Pescadores.

[37] For. Affairs, v. 14, p. 486) Rumulo, C. P., "The Philippines Look at Japan" (*Foreign Affairs*, v. 14, p. 486); Isimaru, *Japan Must Fight Britain*, p. 329.

America's concept of international order under law. United States trade was growing to Japan's detriment. The distances which the United States had to traverse—3,445 miles from Yokohama to Pearl Harbor, Pearl Harbor's 5,000 miles to Manila, Manila's 1,400 miles radius to Japan and 500 miles radius to Formosa—presented strategic problems of great difficulty which Japan thoroughly understood. Clearly the United States could not afford to restrict any construction of bases. Furthermore, should she agree to do so, it might conflict with her plans to improve Aleutian fortifications.[28] The United States had viewed the growth of Singapore with some pleasure, since it bolstered to some degree her position in Hawaii, but she did not feel that it alone was sufficient to counteract Japan's Chinese policy, nor to protect the Philippines. After all, at the nearest point the Philippines and Formosa were only 65 miles apart.

Throughout the 1930s there was marked coolness between the British and Japanese Fleets at sea in the Far East. This coolness reflected the attitudes of the two governments. At the same time American and British Forces were becoming increasingly friendly. In the middle of November, 1936, American warships comprised the first foreign fleet to visit the new Singapore. The attack on the *Panay*, 12 December 1937, served only to tighten Anglo-American relations. Secretary Hull announced that "each government was fully familiar with the position of the other" in regard to the use of the Singapore docks.[29] It was significant that when the new base at Singapore was at last opened in 1938 only three foreign warships, the *Trenton*, the *Memphis*, and the *Milwaukee*, were present. That Japan did not approve of this Anglo-American understanding needs no emphasis.

(10)

Early in 1942 the British lost Singapore. If it proved nothing else the loss showed that the opponents of a defense system in the Straits of Malacca had been wrong, that the advocates had been right. It was perhaps fitting, too, that the base should fall to Japan.

If it seems somewhat far-fetched to think there is much relation between a naval base at Singapore and the price of rubber

[28] Not until Hitler's Czechoslovakian coup in March 1939 did the United States decide to improve Guam, less than 1,500 miles from Tokyo. This was just after Japan had annexed Hainan, less than 1,000 miles from Singapore, and almost simultaneously with her annexation of the Spratley Islands, 640 miles from Singapore.

[29] London *Times*, 10 March 1938. (cf. *ibid*, 19 March 1925.

in the United States, it would only seem more so to suggest that there is a relation between this naval base and the price a citizen of Fort Wayne, Indiana, must pay for tennis balls. There is, no doubt, relation between Sir Stanford Raffles and these same tennis balls.

There is inter-relation and recurring similarity in events. Ramsay MacDonald tells the House of Commons the Singapore project is a "colossal folly." What colossal follies there might have been had this one not been created is a matter for speculation. What is the relation between a MacDonald and those who today, like him, would have us "leave things alone so they may evolve to a nice solution by themselves"?[40]

[40] Commons Debates, 23 July 1923.

How would everything have evolved in the Pacific if the British had not built at Singapore, if rather they had in fact trusted in a profound misconception of the goodness of Japan? Is it sufficient, just because one does not like war, to refuse to prepare against the day war comes?

LEWIS M. WIGGIN
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Yale's Master of Arts in Teaching Program

A Progress Report

A year ago a generous grant from the Carnegie Corporation enabled Yale to launch a new program in teacher education. Our first anniversary provides a natural occasion for review, self-appraisal, and a glance ahead.

The problem of staffing schools with qualified teachers in adequate numbers is still as pressing as it was a year ago when President Griswold called on the University to enlist the full scope of its resources in a new program to train better teachers for secondary schools and junior colleges. There have been indications, however, that the problem has caused an increasing professional and popular concern, which gives hope for the future.

Yale is but one of several institutions to seek a partial remedy for the situation. Harvard can justly claim priority for a parallel program, also based on a coordination of the academic and the professional. The George Peabody College for Teachers and Yale are both concluding the first year of similar experiments. And Wesleyan has just instituted a two-year graduate curriculum in which abundant laboratory experience will serve to bring the theoretical instructions into focus. Far from feeling that programs already in existence are threatened by new accretions, these institutions welcome each new provram conceived along the same lines; the formula which involves close team play between the academics and the professionals thus comes closer and closer to being generally accepted. The fact is that all of these institutions are consciously trying to change the patterns of American education; by combining their efforts, as they are doing, they can achieve a greater cumulative effect.

Speaking specifically of the Yale M. A. T. program, as it is called, what are the features which have gained for it such ready acceptance?

First, the very principle on which it is based. The accusations which academics and professionals level at each other tend to melt away when they work together in a program in which both have a stake; instead they experience and enjoy the intellectual stimulation which comes from the conflict of widely divergent views, properly ventilated.

Second the program assures a thorough knowledge of subject-matter. Most states require only an undergraduate major in the subject to be taught. This program requires in addition two graduate courses in the academic field and maintains the same high requirements for admission as other departments in the Graduate School.

Third, this program is well on the way to achieving an integration unknown even in small liberal arts colleges. On the undergraduate level, the courses in Education have been completely revised in order to eliminate possible duplication, often found in such courses as the History of Education, the Philosophy of Education, Educational Psychology, the Secondary School, etc. In undergraduate seminars entitled *Basic Concepts in Education* and *Basic Issues in Education* the essential elements of these various subjects are carefully integrated and set in a context of cultural anthropology and sociology. The faculty responsible for the course this year includes an historian and philosopher of education, an educational psychologist, a sociologist, and a social anthropologist, as well as a number of special lecturers. Theory is tested by repeated visits to schools in the area. Integration on the graduate level is achieved through the Executive Committee and through such experimental courses as *Problems of Teaching Chemistry, Special Readings in English Language and Literature,* both given this year, and the *Teaching of Modern Languages,* to be offered during the summer and next year.

The whole program is conceived as an experiment, an experiment in social science, and is, therefore, subject constantly to reexamination and revision. This feature has been recognized and applauded by an Eight-State Committee for the Appraisal of the Program in a report which has just been received. Following this report two of the states, Connecticut and New York, have already formally taken action to approve the Master of Arts in Teaching program.

The real test will come, however, when our young teachers actually begin their teaching. After they have taught for a year or longer, they will be in a position to tell us how well we prepared them, professionally, academically, philosophically, for the rugged business of teaching. They, and especially their supervisors, will be able to give us the answers that we are seeking to such questions as these: How well do they know their subjects? How skillful are they in putting them over? How well do they know the children entrusted to them and how successful are they in firing their imaginations? How well do they work with their

colleagues and supervisors? Is their missionary zeal equal to the frustrations induced by low salaries, cruel teaching loads, and inadequate community support for education? Can they do a good job of teaching and still have energy left to exert a constructive influence within their school, profession, and community? It will take five years to get significant answers to these questions, but all indications so far give hope of success.

THEODORE ANDERSSON, *Director*
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